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Abstract
We extend the Faulty RAM model by Finocchi and Italiano (2008) by adding a safe memory of
arbitrary size S, and we then derive tradeoffs between the performance of resilient algorithmic
techniques and the size of the safe memory. Let δ and α denote, respectively, the maximum
amount of faults which can happen during the execution of an algorithm and the actual number of
occurred faults, with α ≤ δ. We propose a resilient algorithm for sorting n entries which requires
O (n log n+ α(δ/S + logS)) time and uses Θ (S) safe memory words. Our algorithm outperforms
previous resilient sorting algorithms which do not exploit the available safe memory and require
O (n log n+ αδ) time. Finally, we exploit our sorting algorithm for deriving a resilient priority
queue. Our implementation uses Θ (S) safe memory words and Θ (n) faulty memory words
for storing n keys, and requires O (log n+ δ/S) amortized time for each insert and deletemin
operation. Our resilient priority queue improves the O (log n+ δ) amortized time required by
the state of the art.
Keywords: resilient algorithm, resilient data structure, memory errors, sorting, priority queue,
tradeoffs, fault tolerance
1. Introduction
Memories of modern computational platforms are not completely reliable since a variety of
causes, including cosmic radiations and alpha particles [1], may lead to a transient failure of a
memory unit and to the loss or corruption of its content. Memory errors are usually silent and
hence an application may successfully terminate even if the final output is irreversibly corrupted.
This fact has been recognized in many systems, like in Sun Microsystems servers at major cus-
tomer sites [1] and in Google’s server fleets [2]. Eventually, a few works have also shown that
memory faults can cause serious security vulnerabilities (see, e.g., [3]).
As hardware solutions, like Error Correcting Codes (ECC), are costly and reduce space and
time performance, a number of algorithms and data structures have been proposed that provide
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(almost) correct solutions even when silent memory errors occur. Algorithmic approaches for
dealing with unreliable information have been widely targeted in literature under different set-
tings, and we refer to [4] for a survey. In particular, a number of algorithms and data structures,
which are called resilient, have been designed in the Faulty RAM (FRAM ) [5]. In this model, an
adaptive adversary can corrupt up to δ memory cells of a large unreliable memory at any time
(even simultaneously) during the execution of an algorithm. Resilient algorithmic techniques
have been designed for many problems, including sorting [6], selection [7], dynamic program-
ming [8], dictionaries [9], priority queues [10], matrix multiplication and FFT [11], K-d and
suffix trees [12, 13]. Resilient algorithms have also been experimentally evaluated [14, 11, 15, 16].
1.1. Our results
Previous results in the FRAM model assume the existence of a safe memory of constant size
which cannot be corrupted by the adversary and which is used for storing crucial data such as
code and instruction counters. In this paper we follow up the preliminary investigation in [8]
studying to which extent the size of the safe memory can affect the performance of resilient
algorithms and data structures. We enrich the FRAM model with a safe memory of arbitrary
size S and then give evidence that an increased safe memory can be exploited to notably improve
the performance of resilient algorithms. In addition to its theoretical interest, the adoption
of such a model is supported by recent research on hybrid systems that integrate algorithmic
resiliency with the (limited) amount of memory protected by hardware ECC [17]. In this setting,
S would denote the memory that is protected by the hardware.
Let δ and α denote respectively the maximum amount of faults which can happen during the
execution of an algorithm and the actual number of occurred faults, with α ≤ δ. In Section 2,
we show that n entries can be resiliently sorted in O (n log n+ α(δ/S + logS)) time when a safe
memory of size Θ (S) is available in the FRAM. As a consequence, our algorithm runs in optimal
Θ (n log n) time as soon as δ = O
(√
nS log n
)
and S ≤ n/ log n. When S = ω(1), our algorithm
outperforms previous resilient sorting algorithms, which do not exploit non-constant safe memory
and require O (n log n+ αδ) time [6, 7]. Finally, we use the proposed resilient sorting algorithm
for deriving a resilient priority queue in Section 3. Our implementation uses Θ (S) safe memory
words and Θ (n) faulty memory words for storing n keys, and requires O (log n+ δ/S) amortized
time for each insert and deletemin operation. This result improves the state of art for which
O (log n+ δ) amortized time is required for each operation [10].
1.2. Preliminaries
As already mentioned, we use the FRAM model with a safe memory. Specifically, the adopted
model features two memories: the faulty memory whose size is potentially unbounded, and the
safe memory of size S. For the sake of simplicity, we allow algorithms to exceed the amount of
safe memory by a multiplicative constant factor. The adversary can read the content of the faulty
memory and corrupt at any time memory words stored in any position of the faulty memory for
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up to a total δ times. Note that faults can occur simultaneously and the adversary is allowed
to corrupt a value which was already previously altered. The safe memory can be read but
not corrupted by the adversary. A similar model was adopted in [8], however in this paper the
adversary was not allowed to read the safe memory. We denote with α ≤ δ the actual number of
faults injected by the adversary during the execution of the algorithm. Since the performance of
our algorithms do not increase as soon as S > δ, we assume through the paper that S ≤ δ; this
assumption can be easily removed by replacing S with min{S, δ} in our algorithms.
A variable is reliably written if it is replicated 2δ+1 times in the faulty memory and its actual
value is determined by majority: clearly, a reliably written variable cannot be corrupted. We say
that a value is faithful if it has never been corrupted and that a sequence is faithfully ordered if
all the faithful values in it are correctly ordered. Finally, we assume all faithful input values to
be distinct, each value to require a memory word, and that each sequence or buffer to be stored
in adjacent memory words.
2. Resilient Sorting Algorithm
In the resilient sorting problem we are given a set of n keys and the goal is to correctly order
all the faithful input keys (corrupted keys can be arbitrarily positioned). We propose S-Sort, a
resilient sorting algorithm which runs in O (n log n+ α (δ/S + logS)) time by exploiting Θ (S)
safe memory words. Our approach builds on the resilient sorting algorithm in [6], however major
changes are required to fully exploit the safe memory. In particular, the proposed algorithm
forces the adversary to inject Θ (S) faults in order to invalidate part of the computation and to
increase the running time by an additive O (δ + S logS) term. In contrast, O (1) faults suffice
to increase by an additive O (δ) term the time of previous algorithms [5, 6, 7], even when ω(1)
safe memory is available. Our algorithm runs in optimal Θ (n log n) time for δ = O
(√
Sn log n
)
and S ≤ n/ log n: this represents a Θ
(√
S
)
improvement with respect to the state of the art [6],
where optimality is reached for δ = O
(√
n log n
)
.
S-Sort is based on mergesort and uses the resilient algorithm S-Merge for merging. The
S-Merge algorithm requires O (n+ α (δ/S + logS)) time for merging two faithfully ordered se-
quences of length n each with Θ (S) safe memory. S-Merge is structured as follows. An incomplete
merge of the two input sequences is initially computed with S-PurifyingMerge: this method re-
turns a faithfully ordered sequence Z of length at least 2(n−α) that contains a partial merge of
the input sequences, and a sequence F with the at most 2α remaining keys that the algorithm has
failed to insert into Z. Finally, keys in F are inserted into Z using the S-BucketSort algorithm,
obtaining the final faithfully ordered sequence of all input values. Procedures S-PurifyingMerge
and S-BucketSort are respectively proposed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, while Section 2.3 describes
the resilient algorithms S-Merge and S-Sort.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the S-PurifyingMerge algorithm. X and Y are the input sequences to merge,
and Z is the output buffer. X1, Y1 and Z1 are support buffers stored in the faulty memory, while X2, Y2 and Z2
are support buffers stored in the safe memory. The light gray (resp., dark gray) highlights the structures that are
used in a round (resp., iteration). An inversion (resp., safety) check is invoked any time data are moved from X1
to X2 or from Y1 to Y2 (resp., from Z1 to Z2).
2.1. S-PurifyingMerge algorithm
Let X and Y be the faithfully ordered input sequences of length n to be merged. The S-
PurifyingMerge algorithm returns a faithfully ordered sequence Z of length at least 2(n− α) and
a sequence F of length at most 2α: sequence Z contains part of the merging of X and Y , while
F stores the input keys that the algorithm has deemed to be potentially corrupted and has failed
to insert into Z. The algorithm extends the PurifyingMerge algorithm presented in [6] by adding
a two-level cascade of intermediate buffers, where the smallest ones are completely contained in
the safe memory. Specifically, the algorithm uses six support buffers1:
• Buffers X1 and Y1 of length 4δ+S, and Z1 of length δ+S/2; they are stored in the faulty
memory.
• Buffers X2 and Y2 of length S, and Z2 of length S/2; they are stored in the safe memory.
At high level, the algorithm works as follows (see Figure 1 for a graphical representation).
The computation is organized in rounds. In each round, O (δ) input keys in X and Y are
respectively pumped into buffers X1 and Y1. Then, the algorithm merges these keys in Z1 by
iteratively merging small amounts of data in safe memory: during each iteration, chunks of O (S)
consecutive keys in X1 and Y1 are moved into buffers X2 and Y2, where they are merged in Z2
using a standard merging algorithm. Keys in Z2 are shifted into Z1 at the end of each iteration,
while keys in Z1 are appended to Z at the end of each round. The algorithm performs some
checks, which are explained in details later, when keys are moved among buffers in order to
guarantee resiliency: an inversion check is done every time a key is shifted from X1 to X2 or
from Y1 to Y2; a safety check is executed every time buffer Z1 is appended to Z. If a check is
1It can be shown that a more optimized implementation of S-PurifyingMerge requires only two buffers (i.e., X2
and Y2). However, we describe here the implementation with six support buffers for the sake of simplicity.
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unsuccessful, some critical faults have occurred and then part of the computation must be rolled
back and re-executed.
We now provide a more detailed description. Each round starts by filling buffers X1 and Y1
with the remaining keys in X and Y , starting from those occupying the smallest index positions
(i.e., from the smallest faithful values). Subsequently, the algorithm fills Z1 with at least δ values
from the sequence obtained by merging X1 and Y1 or until there are no further keys to merge.
Specifically, buffer Z1 is filled by iterating the following steps until it contains at least δ values
or there are no further keys to merge in X1, X2, Y1 and Y2:
1. Buffers X2 and Y2 are filled with the remaining keys of X1 and Y1, respectively, starting
from the smallest index position. With the exception of the first iteration of the first round,
an inversion check is executed for each key inserted in X2 and Y2. If a check is unsuccessful,
the current round is restarted. In the first iteration of the first round, each key is inserted
in X2 and Y2 without any check.
2. Buffers X2 and Y2 are merged in Z2, until buffer Z2 is full or there are no further entires in
X2 and Y2. The merging is performed using the standard algorithm since input and output
buffers are stored in safe memory.
3. Buffer Z2 is appended to Z1 and then emptied.
As soon as Z1 is full or there are no further keys, a safety check is performed on Z1: if it
succeeds, buffer Z1 is appended to Z and flushed and then a new round is started; otherwise, the
current round is restarted.
The inversion check works as follows. The check is performed on every new key x of X1
inserted into X2, and on every new key y of Y1 inserted into Y2. We describe the check performed
on each entry x, being the control executed on y defined correspondingly. If X2 is empty, no
operation is done and the check ends successfully. Otherwise, the value x is compared with the
last inserted key x′ in X2. If x is larger than x′, no further operations are done and the check
ends successfully. Otherwise, if x is smaller than or equal to x′, it is possible to conclude that at
least one of the two keys is corrupted since X2 is supposed to be faithfully ordered and each key
to be unique. Then, both keys are inserted into F and removed from X1 and X2; if there exists
at least one value in X2 after the removal, the check ends successfully, and it ends unsuccessfully
otherwise. We observe that inversion checks guarantee X2 and Y2 to be perfectly ordered at any
time (recall that the two buffers are stored in safe memory).
The safety check works as follows. The check is performed when Z1 contains at least δ keys
or there are no more keys to merge. In the last case, the check always ends successfully. Suppose
now that Z1 contains at least δ keys, and let z be the latest key inserted into Z1 which we assume
to be stored in safe memory. Denote with X ′ (resp., Y ′) the concatenation of keys in X2 and
X1 (resp., Y2 and Y1). If there are less than S/2 keys in X
′ and Y ′ smaller than or equal to z,
the safety check ends successfully. Otherwise, the algorithm scans X ′ starting from the smaller
position and compares each pair of adjacent keys looking for inversions: if a pair is not ordered,
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it is possible to conclude that at least one of the two values has been corrupted, and hence both
keys are inserted in F and removed from X ′. A similar procedure is executed for Y ′ as well. The
check then ends unsuccessfully.
When a round is restarted due to an unsuccessful check, the algorithm replaces keys in Zi,
Xi and Yi, for any i ∈ {1, 2}, with the keys contained in the respective buffers at beginning
of the round (specifically, just after the algorithm terminates to fill buffers X1 and Y1 with
new keys). However, keys that have been moved to F during the failed round are not restored
(empty positions in X1 and Y1 are suitably filled with keys in X and Y ). This operation can be
implemented by storing a copy of X1, Y1 and Z1 in the faulty memory, and of X2, Y2 and Z2 in
the safe memory. For every key moved to F , the key is also removed from the copies2.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be two faithfully ordered sequences of length n. S-PurifyingMerge returns
a faithfully ordered sequence Z of length |Z| ≥ n− 2α containing part of the merge of X and Y ,
and a sequence F of length |F | ≤ 2α containing the remaining input keys. The algorithm runs
in O (n+ αδ/S) time and uses Θ (S) safe memory words.
Proof: It is easy to see that the algorithm uses Θ (S) safe memory and that each input key must
be in Z or F . We prove that Z is faithfully ordered as follows: we first show that Z1 is faithfully
ordered at the end of each round; we then argue that Z1 can be appended to Z without affecting
the faithful order of Z. We say that a round is successful if the round is not restarted by an
unsuccessful inversion or safety check. For proving the correctness of the algorithm we focus on
successful rounds since unsuccessful ones do not affect Z.
Let us now show that buffer Z1 contains a faithfully ordered sequence at the end of a successful
round. Inversion checks guarantee that any key inserted in X2 is not smaller than the previous
one, and then buffer X2 is sorted at any time. Moreover, since the round is successful, buffer X2
always contains at least one key during the round and, in particular, the buffer contains a key
between two consecutive iterations. This fact guarantees that the concatenation Xˆ of all keys
inserted in X2 in each iteration of the round creates an ordered sequence. Similarly, we have that
the concatenation Yˆ of all keys inserted in Y2 in each iteration of the round is ordered. Each
iteration of the round merges in safe memory a part of Xˆ and Yˆ . Then. the concatenation of
all keys written into Z2 during the round is the correct merge of Xˆ and Yˆ (note that the largest
keys in Xˆ and Yˆ are not merged and are kept in X2 and Y2). Since these output keys are first
stored in Z2 and then in Z1, we can claim that Z1 is a faithfully ordered sequence: indeed, there
can be an out-of-order key in Z1 due to a corruption occurred after the key has been moved from
Z2 to Z1.
We now prove that Z is faithfully ordered. If the algorithm ends in one successful round,
then Z is faithful ordered by the previous claim. We now suppose that there are at least two
2An entry can be removed from a sequence in constant time by moving the subsequent entries in the correct
position as soon as they are read and by maintaining the required pointers in the safe memory.
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successful rounds. Let Zi1 be the two buffers appended to Z at the end of the i-th and (i+ 1)-st
successful round. We have that Zi1 and Z
i+1
1 are faithfully ordered by the previous claim, and we
now argue that even the concatenation of Zi1 and Z
i+1
1 is faithfully ordered. Let z be the latest
value z inserted in Zi1: since z is maintained in safe memory, we have that z is larger than all
the faithful values in Zi1 and smaller than all values in X2 and Y2. Since the round is successful,
there are at most S/2 keys smaller than or equal to z in X ′ and hence at least δ + 1 keys larger
than z in X ′: indeed, the 4δ + S entries in X1 at the beginning of the round can be moved in
F (at most 2δ), in Z1 (at most δ + S/2− 1), or in X2 (thus remaining in X ′). Therefore, there
exists a faithful key in X ′ larger than z, and hence all the faithful values remaining in X must
be larger than z. The at most S/2 keys smaller than or equal to z must be in X1, and they will
be removed by inversion checks in subsequent rounds since there are at least S/2 values in X2
larger than z (note that there are always at least S/2 keys X2 at the end of an iteration). Since
a similar claim applies to Y , we have that all faithful keys in Zi+11 are larger than those in Z
i
1.
It follows that Z, which is the concatenation of Z11 , Z
2
1 , . . ., is faithfully ordered.
Finally, we upper bound the running time of the algorithm. If no corruption occurs, the
algorithm requiresO (n) time since there areO (n/δ) rounds, each one requiringO (δ/S) iterations
of cost O (S). Faults injected by the adversary during the first iteration of the first round cannot
restart the round, but increase the running time by at most a factor O (α) since each fault can
cause two keys to be moved in buffer F . Consider an unsuccessful round that fails due to an
inversion check. Since at the beginning of each iteration there are at least S/2 keys in both X2
and Y2, then at least S/2 inverted pairs are required for emptying X2 or Y2 and the adversary
must pay S/2 faults for getting an unsuccessful inversion check. Consider now an unsuccessful
round that fails due to a safety check. Since there are at leas S/2 keys larger than or equal to z
in X2 and Y2 and there are at least S/2 keys smaller than z in X1 and Y1, there must be at least
S/2 inversions. Since at least S/2 of these inversions are removed during the safely check and
cannot be used by the adversary for failing another round, the adversary must pay S/2 faults for
getting an unsuccessful safety check. In all cases, each unsuccessful round costs O (δ) time to the
algorithm and S/2 faults to the adversary: since there cannot be more than b2α/Sc unsuccessful
rounds, the overhead due to unsuccessful rounds is O (αδ/S). The lemma follows. 
2.2. S-BucketSort Algorithm
Let X be a faithfully ordered sequence of length n1 and Y an arbitrary sequence of length
n2. The S-BucketSort algorithm computes a faithfully ordered sequence containing all keys in X
and Y in O (n1 + (n2 + δ)n2/S + (n2 + α) logS) time using a safe memory of size Θ (S). This
algorithm extends and fuses the NaiveSort and UnbalancedMerge algorithms presented in [6].
The algorithm consists of dn2/Se rounds. At the beginning of each round, the algorithm
removes the S smallest keys among those remaining in Y and stores them into an ordered
sequence P maintained in safe memory. Subsequently, the algorithm scans the remaining keys
of X, starting from the smallest position, and partitions them among S + 1 buckets Bi where B0
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contains keys in (−∞, P [1]), Bi keys in [P [i], P [i+ 1]) for 1 ≤ i < S and BS keys in [P [S],+∞).
The scan of X ends once δ + 1 keys have been inserted into BS or there are no more keys left
in X. For each key x in X, the search of the bucket is crucial for improving performance and
proceeds as follows: the algorithm checks if x belongs to the range of the last used bucket Bk,
for some 0 ≤ k ≤ S; if the check fails, then the algorithm verifies if x belongs to the right/left
logS adjacent buckets of Bk; if this search is again unsuccessful, the correct buffer is identified by
performing a binary search on P . When the correct bucket is found, entry x is removed from X
and appended to the sequence of keys already in the bucket, thus guaranteeing that each bucket
is faithfully ordered. When the scan of X ends, the sequence given by the concatenation of
B0, P [1],B1, P [2], . . . ,BS−1, P [S] is appended to the output sequence Z, keys in BS are inserted
again in X (in suitable empty positions of X that maintain the faithful order of X), P and the
S+1 buckets Bi are emptied and a new round is started. After the dn2/Se rounds, all remaining
keys in X are appended to Z.
The S smallest values of Y , which are used in each round for determining the buckets, are
extracted from Y using the following approach. At the beginning of S-BucketSort (i.e., before
the first round), a support priority queue containing S nodes is constructed in safe memory as
follows. Keys in Y are partitioned into S segments of size dn2/Se and a node containing the
smallest key and a pointer to the segment is inserted into the priority queue (the segment is
stored in the faulty memory). Each time the smallest value is required, the smallest value y
of the queue is extracted (we note that y is the minimum faithful key among those in Y or a
corrupted key even smaller). Then, y is removed from the queue and from the respective buffer,
and a new node with the new smallest key and a pointer to the segment is inserted in the queue.
When a value is removed from a segment, the remaining values in the segment are shifted to
keep keys stored in consecutive positions. At the beginning of each round, the S values used
for defining the buckets are obtained by S subsequent extractions of the minimum value in the
priority queue and maintained in S safe memory words.
Lemma 2. Let X be a faithfully ordered sequence of length n1 and let Y be a sequence of length
n2. S-BucketSort returns a faithfully ordered sequence containing the merge of keys in X and Y .
The algorithm runs in O (n1 + (n2 + δ)n2/S + (n2 + α) logS) time and uses Θ (S) safe memory
words.
Proof: It is easy to see that the algorithm uses Θ (S) safe memory and that each key of X
and Y must be in the output sequence at the end of the algorithm. We now argue that the
output sequence Z is faithfully ordered at the end of the algorithm: we first prove that the
sequence appended to Z at the end of each round is faithfully ordered, and then show that it
can be appended to Z without affecting the faithful order of Z. We now prove that the sequence
appended to Z at the end of a round is faithfully ordered. For each 0 ≤ i ≤ S, each faithful
key appended to bucket Bi is in the correct range (note that P cannot be corrupted being in
safe memory) and the sequence of keys in Bi is faithfully ordered since the insertion maintains
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the order of faithful keys in X. Therefore, the sequence B0, P [1],B1, P [2], . . . ,BS−1, P [S] that is
appended to Z is faithfully ordered. We now show that the appended sequence guarantees the
faithful order of Z by proving that, at the end of a round, the faithful keys that remain in X
are larger than those already in Z (i.e., faithful keys that are appended in subsequent rounds
are larger). If the round ends since there are no further keys in X, the claim is trivially true.
Suppose now that the round ends since there are δ + 1 keys in BS . Then, there must exist at
least one faithful key larger than P [S] in BS and all remaining faithful values in X must be larger
than P [S]. Therefore, we can conclude that Z is faithfully ordered at the end of the algorithm:
by the above argument Z is faithfully ordered at the end of the last round; the keys in X that
are appended to Z after the last round do not affect the faithful order of Z since X is faithfully
ordered and faithful keys in X are larger than those already in Z.
We now upper bound the running time. Suppose no corruptions occur during the execution of
the algorithm. Extracting the S smallest keys from Y using the auxiliary priority queue requires
O (n2 + S logS) time (O (n2 log n2) time if n2 < S) for each of the dn2/Se rounds, and therefore
a total O (n2(n2/S + logS)) time. The insertion of an entry X[i] in a bucket, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n1,
requires O (1 + min{fi, logS}) = O (1 + fi), where fi is the number of keys of Y in the range
(X[i− 1], X[i]): indeed, the algorithm searches the bucket for X[i] among the O (min{fi, logS})
buckets around the one containing X[i − 1] and then, only in case of failure, performs a binary
search on P . When no fault occurs, each key of Y contributes to one of the fi’s since X is sorted.
Therefore, the partitioning of X costs O (
∑n1
i=1(1 + fi)) = O (n1 + n2). We note that the above
analysis ignores the fact that in each round δ + 1 values are moved back from BS to X this fact
leads to an overall increase of the running time given by an additive component O (δdn2/Se),
which follows by charging O (δ) additional operations to each round. A fault in X may affect the
running time required for partitioning X. In particular, each fault may force the algorithm to
pay O (logS) for the corrupted key and the subsequent one in X: indeed, a corruption of X[i]
may force the algorithm to perform a binary search in order to find the right bucket for X[i]
and for the subsequent key X[i+ 1]. The additive cost due to α faults is hence O (α logS). The
corruption of keys in Y does not affect the running time since the algorithm does not exploit the
ordering of Y . The lemma follows. 
2.3. S-Merge and S-Sort Algorithms
As previously described, S-Merge processes the two input sequences with S-PurifyingMerge
and then the two output sequences are merged with S-BucketSort. We get the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let X and Y be two faithfully ordered sequences of length n. Algorithm S-Merge
faithfully merges the two sequences in O (n+ α (δ/S + logS)) time using Θ (S) safe memory
words.
Proof: By Lemma 1, algorithm S-PurifyingMerge returns a faithful sequence Z of length at most
2n and a sequence F of length at most 2α in O (n+ αδ/S) time. These output sequences are
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then combined using the S-BucketSort algorithm: by Lemma 2, this algorithm returns a faithfully
ordered sequence of all the input elements in O (n+ α (δ/S + logS)) time. The lemma follows.

By using S-Merge in the classical mergesort algorithm3, we get the desired resilient sorting
algorithm S-Sort and the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let X be a sequence of length n. Algorithm S-Sort faithfully sorts the keys in X
in O (n log n+ α (δ/S + logS)) time using Θ (S) safe memory words.
Proof: Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, n to be a power of two, and denote with αi,j
the number of faults that are detected by S-Merge on the j-th recursive problem which operates
on input sequences of length 2i, with 0 ≤ i < log n and 0 ≤ j < n/2i. A fault injected in one
sub-problem at level i may affect the parent problem at level i+1, but cannot affect sub-problems
at level i+ 2. Indeed, a key x corrupted during the sub-problem at level i may be out-of-order in
the output sequence. Key x is then recognized by the S-Merge at level i+ 1 as a fault, inserted
in F by S-PurifyingMerge, and then positioned in the correct order in the output sequence by
S-BucketSort (x will thus be consider as a faithful key in the parent problem at level i + 2).
Another fault might cause key x to be stored out-of-order again in the output sequence at level
i + 1, but this fact is accounted to the new fault. Hence, we get
∑logn−1
i=0
∑2i−1
j=0 αi ≤ 2α. By
the upper bound on the time of S-Merge in Lemma 3, we get that the running time of S-Sort is
upper bounded by
O
logn−1∑
i=0
2i−1∑
j=0
(
n/2i + αi,j (δ/S + logS)
) .
The correctness of S-Sort follows by the correctness of S-Merge. 
3. Resilient Priority Queue
A resilient priority queue is a data structure which maintains a set of keys that can be
managed and accessed through two main operations: Insert, which allows to add a key to the
queue; and Deletemin, which returns the minimum faithful key among those in the priority queue
or an even smaller corrupted key and then removes it from the priority queue.
In this section we present an implementation of the resilient priority queue that exploits a
safe memory of size Θ (S). Let n denote the number of keys in the queue. Our implementation
requires O (log n+ δ/S) amortized time per operation, Θ (S) words in the safe memory and Θ (n)
words in the faulty memory. Our resilient priority queue is based on the fault tolerant priority
queue proposed in [10], which is in turn inspired by the cache-oblivious priority queue in [18]. The
3The standard recursive mergesort algorithm requires a stack of length O (logn) which cannot be corrupted.
However, it is easy to derive an iterative algorithm where a Θ (1) stack length suffices.
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Pointer pU
Pointer pD
Figure 2: Main support structures of the resilient priority queue (layers L1, . . . , Lk−1 are omitted). The figure
shows the immediate insertion buffer I0, the priority queue PI and the respective pointed buffers, and layer L0.
Layer L0 consists of the up buffer U0, the down buffer D0, the priority queues PU and PD, and the pointers pU
and pD. The first δ + 1 entries of U0 and of D0 are organized in up to S sub-buffers of maximum size δ/S + 1.
Each sub-buffer of U0 (resp., D0) is pointed by a node in PU (resp., PD). All priority queues are stored in the
safe memory, while buffers are contained in the faulty memory. Underlined keys are corrupted, while bold keys
are used as priority in some queue. Each range [x, y] gives the minimum and maximum number of contained keys
in a buffer or nodes in a priority queue.
performance of the resilient priority queue is here improved by exploiting the safe memory and
the S-Merge and S-Sort algorithms, in place of the resilient merging and sorting algorithms in [6].
It is important to point out that the Ω (log n+ δ) lower bound in [10] on the performance of the
resilient priority queue does not apply to our data structure since the argument assumes that keys
are not stored in safe memory between operations. The amortized time of each operation in our
implementation matches the performance of classical optimal priority queues in the RAM model
when the number of tolerated corruptions is δ = O (S log n): this represents a Θ (S) improvement
with respect to the state of the art [10], where optimality is reached for δ = O (log n).
The presentation is organized as follows: we first present in Section 3.1 the details of the
priority queue implementation, with particular emphasis on the role played by the safe memory;
then we proceed in Section 3.2 to prove its correctness and complexity bounds.
3.1. Structure
The structure of our resilient priority queue is similar to the one used in [10], however we
require some auxiliary structures and different constraints in order to exploit the safe memory.
Specifically, the resilient priority queue presented in this paper contains the following structures
(see Figure 2 for a graphical representation):
• The immediate insertion buffer I0, which contains up to log n + δ/S keys. This buffer is
stored in the faulty memory.
• The priority queue PI , which contains up to S nodes. Each node contains a pointer to a
buffer of size at most log n + δ/S and the priority key of the node is the smallest value
in the pointed buffer. Buffers are stored in the faulty memory, while the actual priority
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queue PI and other structural information (e.g., buffer length, the position in the buffer
of the smallest key) are stored in O (S) safe memory words. The purpose of PI is to act
as a buffer between the newly inserted data in I0 and the main structure of the priority
queue, that is layers L0, . . . , Lk−1 (see below). On the one hand it allows to rapidly access
the newly inserted keys, while on the other hand it accumulates such keys so that the
computational cost necessary for inserting all these keys in the main structure is amortized
over the insertion of at least S log n+ δ new values.
• The layers L0, . . . , Lk−1, with k = O (log n). Each layer Li contains two faithfully ordered
buffers Ui and Di, named up buffer and down buffer, respectively. Up and down buffers
are connected by a doubly linked list: for each 0 ≤ i < k, buffer Ui is linked to Di−1 and
Di and vice versa. The layers are stored in the faulty memory, while the size and the links
to the neighbors of each buffer are reliably written (i.e., replicated 2δ + 1 times) in the
faulty memory using additional Θ (δ) space. For each layer, we define a threshold value
si = 2
i+1
(
S log2 n+ δ (logS + δ/S)
)
which is used to determine whether an up buffer Ui
has too many keys or a down buffer Di has too few. Specifically, we impose the following
order and size invariants on all up and down buffers at any time:
– (I1) All buffers are faithfully ordered;
– (I2) For each 0 ≤ i < k − 1, the concatenations DiDi+1 and DiUi+1 are faithfully
ordered;
– (I3) For each 0 ≤ i < k − 1, si/2 ≤ |Di| ≤ si (this invariant may not hold for the last
layer);
– (I4) For each 0 ≤ i < k, |Ui| ≤ si/2.
• The priority queues PU and PD and the pointers pU and pD, which are stored in the safe
memory. These queues are used to speed up the access to entries in U0 and D0. We
consider the buffer U0 as the concatenation of two buffers U
P
0 and U
S
0 . U
S
0 contains keys in
the δ+1 smallest positions (if any) of U0, while U
P
0 contains all the remaining keys (if any)
in U0. U
S
0 itself is divided into up to S sub-buffers, each one with maximum size δ/S + 1
and associated with one node of PU : each node maintains a pointer to the beginning of
a sub-buffer of US0 and its priority key is the smallest value in the respective sub-buffer.
Each node also contains support information such as the size of the relative sub-buffer
and the position of the smallest key in the sub-buffer. pU points to the first element of
UP0 . This structure ensures that the concatenation of a resiliently sorted U
S
0 with U
P
0 is
a faithful ordering of all the elements in U0 at all times. The priority queue PU can be
built by determining the minimum element of each sub-buffer in US0 and then by building
the priority queue in safe memory. The priority queue PD and pointer pD are analogously
constructed from buffer D0.
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Since the priority queues PI , PU and PD are resiliently stored, we use any standard imple-
mentation that supports the Peekmin operation, which is an operation that returns the minimum
value in the priority queue without removing it. We note that buffer sizes (i.e., si) depend on
n: As suggested in [10], a global rebuilding of the resilient priority queue is performed when the
number of keys in it varies by Θ (n). The rebuilding is done by resiliently sorting all the keys
and then distributing them among the down buffers starting from D0.
The functioning and purpose of the auxiliary structures will be detailed in the description of
the Insert and Deletemin operations in Section 3.1.1. We now provide an intuitive explanation
of the functioning of our priority queue. Newly inserted keys are collected in the immediate
insertion buffer I0 and in the buffers pointed by nodes in PI , while the majority of the previously
inserted values are maintained in the up and down buffers in the k layers Li. The role of the
down buffers is to contain small keys that are likely to be soon removed by Deletemin and then
should move towards the lower levels (i.e., I0, PI or L0); on the other hand, up buffers store large
keys that will not be required in the short time (note that this fact is a consequence of invariant
(I2)). Keys are moved among layers by means of the two fundamental primitives Push and Pull:
these functions, which are described in Section 3.1.2, are invoked when the up and down buffers
violate the size invariants, and exploit the resilient merging algorithm S-Merge. The purpose of
the support structures is to reduce the overhead necessary for the management of the priority
queue in the presence of errors by reducing the number of invocations to the costly maintenance
tasks (i.e., Push or Pull) and by amortizing their computational cost over multiple executions
of Insert or Deletemin. It will be evident in the subsequent section that PU and PD may cause
a discrepancy with respect to the order invariants (I1) and (I2) for the first O (δ) positions of
buffers D0 and U0. However, we will see that this violation can be in general ignored and can
be quickly restored any time the algorithm needs to exploit the invariants on D0 and U0, that is
any time Push and Pull are invoked.
3.1.1. Insert and Deletemin
The implementation of Insert and Deletemin varies significantly with respect to the resilient
priority queue presented in [10]. In particular, the safe memory plays an important role in order
to obtain the desired performance.
Insert. The newly inserted key is appended to the immediate insertion buffer I0. If after the
insertion I0 contains log n+ δ/S keys, some values in I0 are moved into other buffers as follows.
Suppose that PI contains less than S nodes. A new buffer I
′ is created in the faulty memory
and filled with the log n+ δ/S keys in I0, then a new node is inserted in PI with the minimum
value in I ′ as key and a pointer to I ′; I0 is flushed at the end of this operation. Suppose now
that PI contains S nodes. All keys in buffer I0, in the buffers pointed by all nodes of PI and in
the sub-buffers managed through PU (i.e., in buffer U
S
0 ) are resiliently sorted using the S-Sort
algorithm. These values are then merged with those in UP0 (if any) using S-Merge, and finally
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inserted into buffer U0. After the merge, the immediate insertion buffer, the priority queue PI
and all its associated buffers are emptied. If the merge does not cause U0 to overflow, the priority
queue PU is rebuilt from the new values in U
S
0 by following the previously described procedure.
On the contrary, if U0 overflows breaking the size invariant (I4), the Push primitive is invoked on
U0, PU is deallocated (since Push removes all keys in U0) and PD is rebuilt following a procedure
similar to the one for PU .
Deletemin. To determine and remove the minimum key in the priority queue it is necessary to
evaluate the minimum key among the at most log n+ δ/S keys in the immediate insertion buffer
I0 and the minimum values in PI , PD and PU , which can be evaluated using Peekmin. Finally,
the minimum key v among these four values is selected, removed from the appropriate buffer as
described below, and hence returned. The removal of v is performed as follows.
• v is in I0. Value v is removed from I0 and the remaining keys in I0 are shifted in order to
ensure that keys are consecutively stored.
• v is in PI . A Deletemin is performed on PI for removing the node with key v. Let I ′ be
the buffer pointed by this node. Then key v is removed from I ′ and the remaining keys
in I ′ are shifted in order to ensure that keys are consecutively stored. We note that the
value v may not be anymore available in I ′ since it has been corrupted by the adversary:
however, since each node contains the position of v in I ′, the faithful value can be restored.
Let cI′ be the new size of I
′. If cI′ ≥ (log n+ δ/S)/2, a new node pointing to I ′ is inserted
in PI using as priority key the new minimum value in I
′. If cI′ < (log n + δ/S)/2 and I0
is not empty, up to (log n+ δ/S)/2 keys are removed from the immediate insertion buffer
and inserted in buffer I ′; then, a new node is inserted in PI pointing to I ′ and with priority
key set to the new minimum value in I ′. Finally, if cI′ < (log n+ δ/S)/2 and I0 is empty,
all values in I ′ are transferred in the immediate insertion buffer I0 and I ′ is deallocated.
• v is in PU . A Deletemin is performed on PU for removing the node with key v. Let U ′
denote the sub-buffer pointed by the removed node. The minimum key v is removed from
U ′ and its spot is filled with the value pointed by pU , which is then increased to point to the
subsequent value in UP0 (if any). If no key can moved to U
′ (i.e., there are no keys in UP0 ),
the empty spot is removed by compacting U ′ in order to ensure that keys are consecutively
stored and no further operations are performed. The new minimum value in U ′ is then
evaluated and inserted in PU with the associated pointer to U
′ (no operation is done if U ′
is empty).
• v is in PD. Operations similar to the previous case are performed if the minimum key is
extracted from PD. In this case, Deletemin may cause D0 to underflow breaking the size
invariant I3: if that happens, the Pull primitive is invoked on D0 and PD is rebuilt following
a procedure analogous to the one previously detailed for PU .
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We observe that the use of the auxiliary structures PU and PD in Deletemin may cause a
discrepancy with respect to the order invariants (I1) and (I2) for buffers U0 and D0. We can
however justify the waiver from (I1) by pointing out that this structure still ensures that the
faithful keys in US0 are smaller than or equal to those in U
P
0 . In particular the concatenation of a
resiliently sorted US0 with U
P
0 is faithfully ordered (similarly in D0). Additionally, we can justify
the waiver from (I2) by observing that the faithful keys in D0 are still smaller than or equal to
those in D1 and U1. Furthermore, the invariants can be easily restored before any invocation of
Push and Pull by resiliently sorting US0 (resp., D
S
0 ) and linking it with U
P
0 (resp., D
P
0 ). Therefore,
since D0 and U0 still behave consistently with the invariants for what pertains the relations with
other buffers and the possibility of accessing the faithful keys maintained by them in the correct
order, we can assume with a slight (but harmless) “abuse of notation” that the invariants are
verified for U0 and D0 as well.
3.1.2. Push and Pull primitives
Push and Pull are the two fundamental primitives used to structure and maintain the resilient
priority queue. Their execution is triggered whenever one of the buffer violates a size invariant in
order to restore it without affecting the order invariants. The primitives operate by redistributing
keys among buffers by making use of S-Merge. The main idea is to move keys in the buffers in
order to have the smaller ones kept in the layers close to the insertion buffer so they can be quickly
retrieved by Deletemin operations, while moving the larger keys to the higher order layers. Our
implementation of Push and Pull corresponds to the one in [10] with the difference that the S-
Merge algorithm proposed in the previous section is used rather than the merge algorithm in [6].
It is important to stress how this variation, while allowing a reduction of the running time of Push
and Pull, does not affect the correctness nor the functioning of the primitives since the merge
algorithm is used with a black-box approach. We remark that, due to the additional structure
introduced by using the auxiliary priority queues PU and PD, every time a primitive involving
either U0 or D0 is invoked it is necessary to restore them to be faithfully ordered buffers. This
can be easily achieved by concatenating the resiliently sorted UP0 (resp., D
S
0 ), with U
S
0 (resp.,
DS0 ). We can exploit PU (resp., PD) to resiliently sort U
P
0 (resp., D
S
0 ) by successively extracting
the minimum values in the priority queue. For the sake of completeness, we describe now the
Push and Pull primitives and we refer to [10] for further details.
Push. The Push primitive is invoked whenever the size of an up buffer Ui grows over the threshold
value si/2, therefore breaking the size invariant (I4). The execution of Push(Ui) works as follows.
If Li is the last layer, then a new empty layer Li+1 is created. Buffers Ui, Di and Ui+1 are merged
into a sequence M using the S-Merge algorithm. Then the first |Di| − δ keys of M are placed
in a new buffer D′i, the remaining |Ui+1| + |Ui| + δ keys are placed in a new buffer U ′i+1, and
an empty U ′i buffer is created. Finally, the newly created buffers U
′
i , D
′
i and U
′
i+1 are used to
respectively replace the old buffers Ui, Di and Ui+1, which are then deallocated. If Li is the
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last layer, U ′i+1 replaces Di+1 instead of Ui+1. If the new buffer U
′
i+1 contains too many keys,
breaking the size invariant (I4), the Push primitive is invoked on U ′i+1. Furthermore, since D
′
i
is smaller than Di, it could violate the size invariant (I3). This violation is handled at the end
of the sequence of Push invocations on up buffers of layers Li, Li+1, . . . , Lj , 0 ≤ i < j < k (we
suppose the i and j indexes to be stored in safe memory). After all the j− i+ 1 invocations, the
affected down buffers are analyzed by simply following the pointers among buffers starting from
Ui, and by invoking the Pull primitive (see below) on the down buffer not satisfying the invariant
(I3).
Pull. The Pull primitive is invoked whenever the size of a down buffer Di goes below the threshold
value si/2, therefore breaking the size invariant (I3). Since this invariant does not hold for the
last layer, we must have that Li is not the last layer. During the execution of Pull(Di) buffers
Di, Ui+1, and Di+1 are merged into a sequence M using the S-Merge algorithm. The first si
keys of M are placed in a new buffer D′i, the following |Di+1| − (si − |Di|)− δ keys are written
to D′i+1, while the remaining keys in M are placed in a new buffer U
′
i+1. The newly created
buffers D′i, D
′
i+1 and U
′
i+1 are then used to respectively replace the old buffers Di, Di+1 and
Ui+1, which are then deallocated. If the down and up buffers in layer Li+1 are empty after this
operation, then layer Li+1 is removed (this can happen only if Li+1 is the last layer). Resulting
from this operation, D′i+1 may break the size invariant (I3), if this is the case Pull is invoked on
D′i+1. Additionally, after the merge, U i+1 may break the size invariant (I4). This violation is
handled at the end of the sequence of Pull invocations on down buffers of layers Li, Li+1, . . . , Lj ,
0 ≤ i < j < k (we suppose the i and j indexes to be stored in safe memory). After all the
j − i + 1 invocations, all the affected up buffers are analyzed by simply following the pointers
among buffers starting from Di, and by invoking the Push primitive wherever invariant (I4) is
not satisfied.
3.2. Correctness and complexity analysis
In order to prove the correctness of the proposed resilient priority queue we show that
Deletemin returns the minimum faithful key in the priority queue or an even smaller corrupted
value. As a first step, it is necessary to ensure that the invocation of one of the primitives Push
or Pull, triggered by an up or down buffer violating a size invariant I3 or I4, does not cause the
order invariants to be broken. The Push and Pull primitives used in our priority queue coincide
with the ones presented for the maintenance of the resilient priority queue in [10]: despite the
fact that in our implementation the threshold si is changed to 2
i+1
(
S log2 +δ (logS + δ/S)
)
, the
proofs provided in [10] (Lemmas 1 and 3) concerning the correctness of Push and Pull still apply
in our case. We report here the statements of the cited lemmas:
Lemma 4 ([10, Lemma 1]). The Pull and Push primitives preserve the order invariants.
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Lemma 5 ([10, Lemma 3]). If a size invariant is broken for a buffer in L0, invoking Pull or
Push on that buffer restores the invariants. Furthermore, during this operation Pull and Push
are invoked on the same buffer at most once. No other invariants are broken before or after this
operation.
For the complete proofs of these lemmas we refer the reader to the original work in [10]. It
is important to remark that both proofs are independent of the value used as size threshold and
hence these proofs hold for our implementation as well. We can therefore conclude that when a
size invariant is broken for a buffer in Li the consequent invocation of Push or Pull does indeed
restore the size invariant while preserving the order invariants which are thus maintained at all
times.
Concerning the computational cost of the primitives, an analysis carried out using the poten-
tial function method [19, Section 17.3] allows to conclude that the amortized time needed for the
execution of both Push and Pull is negligible. A proof of this fact can be obtained by plugging the
complexity of the S-Merge algorithm and the threshold value si defined in our implementation
in the proof proposed in [10, Lemma 5].
Lemma 6. The amortized cost of the Push and Pull primitives is negligible.
Proof: We now upper bound the amortized cost of a call to the Push function on the up buffer Ui
and we ignore at the moment the subsequent chain of calls to Push and Pull(a similar argument
applies to Pull). The cost is computed by exploiting the following potential function defined
in [10]:
Φ =
k∑
i=1
(c1|Ui| (log n− i) + ic2|Di|) .
When a Push operation on Ui is performed, first the Ui, Di and Ui+1 buffers are merged and
then the sorted values are distributed into new buffers such that |U ′i | = 0, |D′i| = |Di| − δ and
|U ′i+1| = |Ui+1|+ |Ui|+ δ. This leads to the following change in potential ∆Φ:
∆Φ = −c1|Ui| (log n− i)− ic2δ + c1 (|Ui|+ δ) (log n− (i+ 1))
= −c1|Ui|+ δ (−ic2 + c1 log n− ic1 − c1) .
Push is invoked when (I4) is not valid for Ui and therefore |Ui| > si/2 = 2i
(
S log2 n+ δ (logS + δ/S)
)
.
Then, standard computations show that, for some constant c′ > 0 independent of c1, we have
∆Φ ≤ −c1|Ui|+ c1δ log n ≤ −c1c′|Ui|.
The time required for the execution of Push, including the time needed to retrieve the reli-
ably stored pointers of the up and down buffers, is dominated by the computational cost of
merging Ui, Di and Ui+1 which, using the S-Merge algorithm, is upper bounded by Tm =
O (|Ui|+ |Di|+ |Ui+1|+ α (logS + δ/S)). By the potential method [19, Section 17.3], the amor-
tized cost of Push follows by adding the merging time Tm to the potential variation ∆Φ. Since
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|Ui| ∈ Θ
(
2i
(
S log2 n+ δ (logS + δ/S)
))
, we have Tm = Θ (|Ui|) = cm|Ui|, where cm is a suitable
constant that depends on S-Merge. The amortized cost of Push is (cm−c1c′)|Ui| and it can be ig-
nored by conveniently tweaking c1 according to the values of cm and c
′ so that (cm−c1c′)|Ui| < 0.
In the particular case for which an invocation of Push involves the buffers U0 and D0, we
have that prior to the standard operations, it is necessary to restore the buffers to their faithfully
sorted version by resiliently sorting US0 (resp., D
S
0 ) and linking it with U
P
0 (resp., D
P
0 ). The
time required to accomplish these operation is dominated by the time necessary to faithfully sort
US0 and D
S
0 according to the previously described technique, which is O (δ (logS + δ/S)). This
implies that the time required for restructuring U0 and D0 is sill dominated by the time required
by Push and is hence negligible.
Since each Push and Pull function is invoked on the same buffer at most once (Lemma 5) and
the amortized cost is negative, we have that the chain of Push and Pull operations that can start
after the initial call is negligible as well. The lemma follows.

The following theorem evaluates the amortized cost of Insert and Deletemin in our resilient
implementation of the priority queue.
Theorem 2. In the proposed resilient priority queue implementation, the Deletemin operation
returns the minimum faithful key in the priority queue or an even smaller corrupted one and
deletes it. Both Deletemin and Insert operations require O (log n+ δ/S) amortized time. The
priority queue uses Θ (S) safe memory words and Θ (n) faulty memory words.
Proof: We first observe that the size and order invariants can be considered maintained at all times
thanks to the maintenance Push and Pull tasks (see Lemmas 4 and 5), with the aforementioned
exception on the first δ + 1 keys in the up and down buffers in L0. Moreover, by Lemma 6, the
cost of Push and Pull can be ignored in our argument.
We now focus on the correctness and complexity of Deletemin. Let v1, v2, v3 and v4 be
the minimum values in I0, PI , PU and PD, respectively. Deletemin evaluates these four values
by scanning all the values in I0 and by performing a Peekmin operation for PI , PU and PD,
respectively. By construction, each value in PI is selected as the minimum among the keys
stored in the associated buffers: since PI is maintained in the safe memory, v2 is smaller than
any faithful value in the associated buffers. Similarly, v3 is smaller than the faithful δ+1 entries in
US0 , and thus of the remaining faithful entries in U
P
0 and of all entries in the up and down buffers
for invariant (I1). Similarly, we also have that v4 is smaller than all faithful keys in D0. We can
then conclude that min{v1, v2, v3, v4} is either the minimum faithful key in the priority queue or
an even smaller corrupted value. The time for determining the minimum key and removing it is
O (log n+ δ/S).
We now discuss the correctness and complexity of Insert. The correctness of the insertion
is evident since the input key is inserted in some support buffer and can be only removed by
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Deletemin. Inserting a key in the immediate insertion buffer requires constant time. If I0 is
full and a new node of the priority queue PI needs to be created, a total O (log n+ δ/S) time
is required in order to find the minimum among the keys in I0 and to insert the new node in
PI . When PI itself is full (i.e., contains S nodes), we have that O
(
S log2 n+ δ (log n+ δ/S)
)
time is required to faithfully sort all keys in I0 and in the buffers managed through PI and PU ,
to faithfully merge them with US0 , and to rebuild PU and PS . However, it will be necessary
to perform these operations at most once every Θ (S log n+ δ) key insertions and therefore its
amortized cost is O (log n+ δ/S).
We recall that the algorithm invokes a global rebuilding every time the number of keys
changes by a Θ (n) factor. Since the cost of the rebuilding is dominated by the cost of the S-Sort
algorithm, which is O (n log n+ δ(δ/S + logS)), the amortized cost is O (log n+ δ/S).
By opportunely doubling or halving the space reserved for the immediate buffer I0, the space
required for I0 is always at most twice the number of keys actually in the buffer. Additionally,
the space required for the buffers maintained by PI is at most double than the number of keys
actually in the buffer itself. The space required for each layer L0, . . . , Lk−1 with k ∈ O (log n),
including the reliably written structural information, is proportional to the number of stored
keys, and therefore Θ (n) faulty memory words are used to store all the layers. Finally, Θ (S)
safe memory words are required to maintain the priority queues PI , PD and PU and for the
correct execution of S-Merge and S-Sort. The theorem follows. 
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that, for the resilient sorting problem and the priority queue
data structure, the presence of a safe memory of size S can be exploited in order to reduce the
computational overhead due to the presence of corrupted values by a factor Θ (S). As future
research, it would be interesting to investigate which other problems can benefit of a non constant
safe memory and propose tradeoffs highlighting the achievable performance with respect to the
size of the available safe memory. We observe that not all problems can in fact exploit an S-size
safe memory: indeed the the Ω (log n+ δ) lower bound for searching derived in [5] applies even if
a safe memory of size S ≤ n, for a suitable constant  ∈ (0, 1), is available. Finally, we remark
that the analysis of tradeoffs between the safe memory size and the performance achievable by
resilient algorithms may provide useful insights for designing hybrid systems mounting both cheap
faulty memory and expensive ECC memory, as recently studied in [17].
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